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2026 Rating of Victorian Infrastructure

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Emeritus Professor John L Wilson was the former CEO/DVC of Swinburne Sarawak and former PVC of the Faculty of Science, Engineering and Technology at Swinburne University of Technology in Melbourne. He has over 45 years' experience in industry and academia with a Bachelor of Engineering degree from Monash University, a Master of Science degree from University of California (Berkeley) and a PhD from University of Melbourne.

He has a research and consulting background in earthquake engineering, structural dynamics, structural engineering and infrastructure systems and has published over 150 journal articles in these fields. He has been the recipient of seven Chapman Medals, one Warren Medal and was awarded an Honorary Fellow of Engineers Australia in 2021.

He has been active in industry with several leadership roles in various organisations including:

- Victorian Chairman of Engineers Australia 2002,
- Spokesperson for the Victorian Infrastructure Report Cards 2005-16 (media articles and interviews),
- Chairman of Judges for the Victorian Engineering Excellence Awards 2011-16
- Co-Editor of the Australian Journal of Structural Engineering 2014-2021
- Chair of BD6/11, the committee responsible for AS1170.4, the Earthquake-loading Standard for Australia 2000-2025
- President of the Australian Council of Engineering Deans 2017-18 and a member of the Executive 2012-2022

Engineers Australia undertook a review of Australia's infrastructure in 2001, 2005, 2010 and Victoria's Infrastructure in 2005 and 2010, but have not undertaken any further report cards since 2010. A Swinburne University of Technology expert who was involved with the previous report cards has provided an updated independent 2026 report rating based on an extensive review. The Report Cards reviewed and rated the infrastructure with an A (very good), B (good), C (adequate), D (poor) or F (inadequate) in the categories across Transport (Roads, Rail, Ports, Airports) Water (potable, waste, stormwater, rural irrigation), Energy (electricity, gas) and Telecommunications.



2026 Rating of Victorian Infrastructure

01
Summary

Engineers Australia undertook a review of Australia's infrastructure in 2001, 2005 and 2010 and Victoria's Infrastructure in 2005 and 2010. The Report Cards reviewed and rated the infrastructure in the categories across Transport (Roads, Rail, Ports, Airports) Water (potable, waste, stormwater, rural irrigation), Energy (electricity, gas) and Telecommunications.

Each of the infrastructure categories were given a rating based on the performance of the assets and overall system for current and future needs that included; current condition and lifespan, functionality, reliability, maintenance management and sustainability. The ratings were on a scale A-F for each category of infrastructure, where:

- 'A' represents 'Very Good' with infrastructure that is fit for current and future purposes,
- 'B' represents 'Good' with minor changes needed to meet current and future needs,
- 'C' represents 'Adequate' but major changes needed to meet current and future needs,
- 'D' represents 'Poor' with critical changes required,
- 'F' represents 'Inadequate' and not fit for purpose
- 'nr' represents 'not rated'

Engineers Australia have not undertaken a further infrastructure Report Card since 2010. The author who was closely involved with the previous reports (Victorian Infrastructure spokesperson and committee member) has provided his updated independent version and rating on the status of Victorian Infrastructure in 2026 based on a wide-ranging review, as presented in Table 1.

Roads, Electricity and Gas have fallen to a rating "D" indicating poor condition with a challenging outlook. Rail has slightly improved to a "C-", mostly driven by the improvements to urban passenger rail. Water and Airports have maintained the status quo with a rating of "C" and "B" respectively and Telecommunication infrastructure has improved to a "B" rating.

The "D" rating for Roads is a direct result of gross underfunding of maintenance over this period and requires a thorough review of the current funding model for roads. Energy consisting of Electricity and Gas, both received a "D" rating that is directly associated with an ideologically driven energy transition that has left the State's energy system vulnerable in the coming years and more reliant on interstate connections. A more detailed commentary on the ratings for each of the infrastructure types is included in this report to support the ratings listed in Table 1.

Table 1: 2026 Infrastructure Ratings compared with past Victorian/ National Report Cards

Infrastructure type	Victoria 2026	Victoria 2010	Victoria 2005	National 2005	National 2001
Roads	**D**	**C+**	**C-**	**C**	**C-**
National	C-	C+	C	C+	C
State	D-	C+	C-	C	C-
Local	D-	C -	C-	C-	D
Rail	**C-**	**D**	**C-**	**C-**	**D-**
Urban passenger	C	nr	nr	nr	nr
Regional passenger	C-	nr	nr	nr	nr
Freight	D+	nr	D	nr	nr
Ports	**C+**	**C+**	**C**	**C+**	**B**
Airports	**B-**	**B**	**Nr**	**B**	**B**
Water	**C**	**C**	**C**	**C**	**C-**
Potable water	C	C	B	B-	C
Wastewater	B-	B-	B	C+	C-
Stormwater	C-	C	C-	C-	D
Irrigation	C	C-	D	C-	D-
Energy	**D**	**C**	**C**	**C+**	**C+**
Electricity	D	C-	C	C+	B-
Gas	D	C	C	C+	C
Telecommunications	**B**	**C**	**nr**	**nr**	**nr**

The overall picture clearly shows that most infrastructure categories have either not improved or have gone backwards, which is an inditement on the incumbent Government that has led the State for the past 12 years. The funding of infrastructure in Victoria has overall been inadequate to maintain the 2010 standards, not alone keep pace with Victoria's 30% population growth between 2010 and 2026 (5.5m to 7.2m with an additional 1.6m citizens). Much of Victoria's infrastructure is now barely adequate for current needs, let alone future needs. This is despite Victoria's $100B+ 'Big Build' investment in new transport projects during this period.

Victoria requires an urgent review of current infrastructure with a funding commitment and rational planning to at least raise the standard of all infrastructure to a rating of at least "C". Consequently, the immediate focus must be on the investment and improvements to the Road infrastructure (urban and regional), the Energy infrastructure (electricity and gas) and ongoing improvements to the Rail infrastructure.

Infrastructure Victoria (IV) was established in 2015 but has now been mooted to be closed in 2027. During this period IV produced several infrastructure planning reports with 30-year horizons, that, whilst very useful documents, did not appear to have much impact on the Government short term decisions that often appeared political driven. The continuation of Infrastructure Victoria with a

different governance framework and refined terms of reference is still considered essential and importantly provides a direct interface with Infrastructure Australia to ensure that Victorian 'business-case-projects' are clearly prioritized, identified and ready for access to Australian Government funding.

A review of Victoria's infrastructure over the last 15 years concludes that funding commitments are largely inadequate to support the substantial costs of maintaining and renewal of existing assets, given the ongoing population growth and the ongoing challenges of sustainability. This is despite an investment of close to $100B+ on the 'Big Build' consisting mostly of new mega rail and road projects around metropolitan Melbourne.

02
Commentary on Victorian Infrastructure Types 2010-2026

Roads (D)

The Victorian Auditor General Office (VAGO) released a 2026 report indicating that 48% of Victoria's State roads were in 'poor or very poor' condition, due to poor maintenance. Victoria's existing State and Local roads have been poorly maintained due to chronic insufficient funding over more than a decade. VicRoads when it was a stand alone and adequately funded organisation used to reseal 10% of its road network each year, which reflected each road being resealed around every 10 years. The bitumen road surface has the dual purpose of providing a wearing surface for traffic and a waterproof membrane to protect the underlying unbound aggregate foundation (sub-base and sub-grade).

Bitumen over time becomes more brittle and less flexible mostly due to chemical reactions in the binder, causing the binder to dry out and lose elasticity in the summer months and hence the 10-year safe life before the surface begins to crack leading to water penetration and the formation of potholes. These potholes increase in width and depth with road traffic, rainfall and over time leading to destruction of the bitumen surface and supporting unbound road foundation and ultimately requiring a rebuild of the road asset. Unfortunately, in Victoria due to budgetary constraints we are now only resealing 2% of the roads (implying a 50-year life cycle for the bitumen surface) and hence the very poor state of Victorian roads that has massive safety and economic ramifications for the State. It is noted that the cost of resealing a road is only about 10% of the cost of rebuilding a badly damaged road and hence not resealing our roads ever 10 years is a false short-term saving that has massive long-term financial, economic and safety consequences for this State.

The condition of the roads has further been deteriorated with the increased vehicular loading, and the 30% population increase since 2010. The vehicular loading increase is attributed to heavier and more frequent freight vehicles, more passenger and commercial vehicles and the gaining popularity of electric vehicles that are typically heavier than conventional cars due to the installed batteries. The increased population has also resulted in significant congestion on our roads since 2010 which

continues to reduce productivity, particularly for urban freight and business and reduces liveability for residents.

Funding for road infrastructure is complex in Australia and reliant on three levels of Government. The primary source of income is from the fuel tax at the bowser that is collected by the Federal Government as part of consolidated general revenue, with a proportion of these funds flowing back to the States as general revenue. Unfortunately, this fuel tax originally collected for ongoing investment in road infrastructure does not have a dedicated hypothetical fund and hence both the Federal and State Governments can redirect this funding according to their priorities and dilute the funding for roads. In addition, electric vehicles are exempt from this fuel excise funding which further creates inequities in the funding model. An urgent review of the whole funding model for road infrastructure is required that involves all three levels of government.

Victoria's 'Big Build' construction program has delivered some significant projects including the following mega road projects: $16B Level Crossing Removal project (LXRP), $10B Westgate Tunnel project and the $26B NE Link project. Each of the projects has suffered from scope changes, questionable productivity issues (highlighted by the overuse of traffic controllers) and alleged corruption claims associated with the CFMEU and organized crime networks, all resulting in significant cost increases.

- Around 90 of the proposed 110 level crossings have been removed, which will result in the Cranbourne, Pakenham, Lilydale, Frankston, Sunbury and Werribee lines all being crossing free at the end of the project. The original cost estimate was around $120m/crossing, which has increased to $150m/crossing when you include the necessary cost of new stations. This has been a very 'good value' project with huge improvement in urban traffic flow and reduced congestion around greater Melbourne plus great benefits to the rail infrastructure with new stations, track and facilities.
- The Westgate Tunnel project was a political project conceived during the 2014 State election to replace the more rational and logical E-W tunnel that was proposed to join the Eastern Freeway to City Link and the Western Ring Road, following a thorough E-W planning study undertaken by Sir Rod Eddington in 2008.
    - The Victorian Government paid out in excess of $1B following the election to the contractors of the E-W project not to proceed and built the Westgate tunnel in partnership with Transurban for an agreed budget of $5.5B that increased to a final cost of $10.2B, whilst the target completion date of 2020 blew out to 2025.
    - Since the opening of the Westgate Tunnel the traffic volumes have been reported to be around 30% of that forecast but cannot be confirmed as the actual volumes are currently 'commercial-in-confidence'. This project highlights the shortcomings of politically conceived projects where there has been insufficient planning, resulting in significant cost and time blowouts and not the best value for public money.
- The NE link mega project connects the M80 Ring Road to the M3 Eastern Freeway and includes a significant upgrade to the M3 including a dedicated bus lane.
    - The original cost was estimated to be around $10B which has since blown out to $26B in 2026 with project delays and changes to the brief. Construction of the project commenced in 2021 with completion currently scheduled for late 2028.
    - The NE Link appears to be a valuable project given that is connecting existing freeways, however there will be severe congestion at the western end of the M3 where the freeway finishes at Hoddle Street. The now abandoned E-W link would have connected the M3 directly to Citylink and the Western Ringroad, greatly reducing such predicted congestion.

- Again, this demonstrates the importance of proper planning of such road projects, so that the resulting system is as efficient, rational and logical as possible.

Overall, the road system was rated D in 2026, a significant fall from the C+ rating in 2010. National roads were rated C- (C+ 2010), State roads rated D- (C+ 2010) and Local roads D- (C- 2010) and overall reflective of the overall significant lack of routine maintenance investment in the existing road system. It appears the priority has been on new mega projects in metropolitan Melbourne at the expense of the existing road system, with significant future funding and political leadership required to improve the existing road assets to bring them back to at least a C rating.

Rail C-

Multiple Victorian Governments neglected major investment in our rail infrastructure during the 1980s and 1990s but investment has improved over the last couple of decades. The C- rating in 2026 is higher than the D rating in 2010 in recognition of the improvements to the rail passenger (urban and regional) and freight infrastructure.

Urban passenger (C): The passenger urban trains have improved over the last 15 years with the LXRP, new stations, line extensions and electrification and new rolling stock. One ongoing concern is the Myki fare system, which is far from world class and well below the standard of other cities such as Sydney, where credit cards can be used for inter-modal travel.

It should be noted that urban rail in Melbourne is supported by an extensive network of trams, light rail and buses, which has not been reviewed in this report. However, great opportunities exist for better timetable co-ordination between trains and buses to improve passenger travel times and satisfaction. Buses could provide the important circumferential connections between train stations on the different radial train lines which would greatly improve passenger mobility in a very cost-effective manner.

Since 2010, urban rail investment has been dominated by two mega projects: Metro Tunnel and the Suburban Rail Loop.

- The new Metro tunnel project that connects trains from the NW (South Kensington) to SE (South Yarra) through the city on a 9Km tunneled route is a flagship mega project, that has been the most significant investment in urban rail since the City Loop in the 1970s. The new Metro project started in 2015 and was completed in early 2026 at a cost of $16B, $5B more than the original estimate of $11B.
- The Suburban Rail Loop is an ambitious outer circle rail infrastructure project from Cheltenham to Werribee, via Box Hill, Melbourne Airport and Sunshine at an estimated cost of $200B. The project was conceived in political secrecy prior to the 2018 State election with minimal planning and was not endorsed by Infrastructure Victoria nor Infrastructure Australia.
    - The capital cost of the project does not have secure funding and is reliant on contributions from the State and Federal Governments and the private sector via significant land taxes (value capture) associated with the proposed adjacent building developments. Analyses of the project demonstrate a significant negative cost benefit ratio indicating that the project costs significantly outweigh the benefits.
    - Despite this overall project assessment, the State Government has proceeded with the

first stage known as the SRL East which is a rail link between Box Hill and Cheltenham with a budget of $35B costed back in 2020 and more realistically will be in the order of $50B. Currently the State Government has budgeted $12B from borrowings, Federal Government has committed $6B and apparently value capture will collect $10B from the adjacent housing developments which is a heavily contested and speculative figure.

- Around $12B of contracts have been signed for this first stage that started in 2022 with preliminary works that are near completion and tunneling ready to commence. The engineering infrastructure community do not believe this is a good value or high-priority project given the extensive need of funding required to raise the standard of our existing infrastructure and particularly to improve the transport options for the fast-growing metropolitan regions in the outer North, West and SE suburbs of Melbourne. This is a highly contentious and expensive project that will leave significant debt for future generations without providing much economic value and should be rated an F 'unfit for purpose'.
- The SRL East train link could be replaced with a dedicated bus lane link using the road system as an alternative transport mode between Box Hill and Cheltenham for a tiny fraction of the SRL tunnel project costs and producing similar benefits for the end user.

Regional passenger (C-): The rural rail system has undergone around a $10B improvement since 2010. The tracks, stations and rolling stock have improved, but service is still a big issue due to the significant increase in patronage from cheaper fares, cost of driving and population increase.

- Regional passengers often complain about the reliability of regional services, with trains cancelled, overcrowding or 'buses replacing trains' due to track works.
- Some of the significant recent projects include: the $4B Regional Rail Link (RRL) that untangled the regional V/Line network from Melbourne's metropolitan lines; the $4B Regional Rail Revival program (RRRP) which upgraded every regional line with 50% funding from the Federal Government; $2B rolling stock investment with locally manufactured 'VLocity' trains.
- In the future, imagine if we had genuine fast rail to a few regional cities (say Geelong and Bendigo to start) and how this could lead to slowing the growth of Melbourne and the distant outer suburbs and instead turbo charging regional growth, using the proven European model of decentralization with excellent rail and road connection between cities.

Freight (D+): Around $0.6B investment since 2010 for upgrade of regional freight lines and connecting outer metropolitan intermodal precincts to the Port of Melbourne.

- The outer metropolitan intermodal precinct of Somerton (Outer SE) has been completed, whilst Truganina (Outer West) and Beveridge (Outer North) are in the planning phase. These projects are significant and will allow a direct connection for imported containers from the Port of Melbourne to be transported by rail to the intermodal facilities on the outskirts of Melbourne and transferred to other freight trains or freight trucks for distribution. Exports of Victorian goods can similarly be facilitated in the reverse direction.
- Despite these initiatives, only 6% of container freight in and out of the Port of Melbourne is rail and roughly 30% of regional freight is moved by rail (measured in Tonne-Km) and hence the D+ rating for rail freight infrastructure, which is a slight improvement on the D rating in 2010.

Ports C+

Victoria's four major ports (Melbourne, Geelong, Hastings, Portland) remain owned by the State Government but are now operated privately though private leaseholds. Around 97% of Victoria's international imports and exports by volume involve sea freight through these four ports, with the Port of Melbourne handling around 85%. Since 2010, the Port of Melbourne's Swanson Dock has been upgraded to allow containers to be unloaded directly to trains and reduce truck traffic on local roads. Overall, the Port infrastructure has been rated C+ the same as the rating in 2010 which had included the Channel deepening project completed in 2009 that benefited both the Ports of Melbourne and Geelong.

Airports B-

Victoria has a combination of major, secondary and regional airports to support air traffic. The two major metropolitan airports are Melbourne Airport and Avalon Airport, whilst the two secondary metropolitan airports are Essendon and Moorabbin. The major regional airports consist of Bendigo, Mildura and LaTrobe Valley with many additional regional public fields. Overall, the airport system is well regulated and supported by Federal and State funds together with private investment at the airports that have been leased to private operators.

Melbourne Airport is the major domestic and international airport servicing Melbourne and has been growing steadily in passenger numbers from 28m passengers in 2010 to 37m in 2026, a growth of 30% with international passenger numbers doubling from 6m in 2010 to 12m in 2026.
During this period Melbourne Airport has invested $4B in improving the terminal facilities (including Terminal 4 opened in 2015) and the supporting road network for passenger access and parking. Melbourne Airport is currently investing a further $7B of private money from 2026 to deliver a third runway (an extra NS runway) and expanding the international terminal facilities to accommodate at least a doubling of passenger numbers in the future.

Melbourne Airport has begun planning for a rail station to provide access to the Melbourne metropolitan rail system and the CBD in readiness for State and Federal funding for the Sunshine to Melbourne Airport rail link.

- It should be noted that back in 2010, Melbourne Airport argued that access to the airport was sufficient with 'Skybus', taxis and private vehicles, without the need for any rail link. It was observed at the time that Melbourne Airport benefitted greatly from the monopoly of car parking with high fees and high margin for their business.
- Melbourne Airport has finally agreed to allow access for the rail link to the airport in 2025 and planning has continued since. A rail link from the airport to the CBD is considered essential for any modern international city and hopefully this could be achieved in Melbourne over the next decade for a cost in the order of $10-15B.

Overall, the Airport infrastructure has been rated B- compared with B in 2010. There has been good investment over the past 15 years, but Melbourne Airport during this period has suffered from congestion with the increased passenger numbers and only recently approved the rail-link which has caused delays but at least the project is now progressing in the planning stage.

Water C

Water overall in 2026 was rated as C the same as 2010. Overall, potable water (C), Wastewater (B-), Stormwater (C-) all maintained the 2010 rating with investment in the existing and new infrastructure sufficient to maintain the existing performance for a population that has grown 30% in this period.

Irrigation (C) in 2026 improved from the (C-) rating in 2010 reflecting the $3B investment by the Victorian and Federal Governments in improving irrigation infrastructure, particularly converting open channel systems (characterized by high water loss from seepage and evaporation) into automated pipelines.

Demand for potable water continues to be satisfactorily supplied from the existing closed catchment reservoirs, water treated from the Yarra (Winneke/Sugarloaf reservoir) and the Desalination plant located in Wonthaggi that was completed and fully commissioned in 2012. Melbourne's reservoirs are currently at 70% capacity, with a low of 50% reached in 2019 following a few years of below average rainfall requiring additional water from the desal plant pumped to the Cardinia reservoir. The water authorities have managed the demand for potable water with good public education about water conservation and timely restrictions when required.

An opportunity in future years is to educate the public into drinking recycled water like many major cities around the world including Singapore. Melbourne has a distinct advantage with the SE Water Treatment plant producing Class A irrigation water, that with an extra process, could produce potable water that could then be easily pumped to Cardinia reservoir as an additional source of water. The cost and energy associated with this 'circular economy' process (potable water converted to wastewater and then converted back to potable water) are much less than undertaking desalination of the high salt content ocean water.

Energy D

Electricity (D): Between 2010 and 2026, Victoria has undergone a dramatic structural shift driven by Government policy from a system dependent on base load fossil fuels providing an abundance of energy to an intermittent renewable system in 2026 that is still dependent on existing and ageing brown coal and gas power stations that on average still supply 60% of the State's generation capacity.

Currently Victoria has 18GW of potential generation capacity consisting of 40% fossil and 60% renewable generation. However, fossil fuels still provide 40%-80% of actual supply reflective of the intermittent renewables that are fundamentally dependent on the sun and wind environmental conditions for generation. This variability highlights the challenge of achieving a reliable electricity system based largely on renewables with the associated significant land footprint and the need for extensive new transmission lines, significant battery storage and backup generation. These additional needs are needed to make an intermittent renewable system reliable with secure power on demand, but add significant cost and environmental impact, particularly over a life cycle of 70 years.

Rooftop solar is a highly cost-effective method of reducing grid demand for residential housing that contributes 25% of overall electricity demand. However, renewable generation alone is insufficient

without large-scale storage such as pumped hydro, battery systems, or backup gas generation. Victorian current policy settings discourage gas, nuclear power, and new dams while remaining heavily dependent on brown coal during the transition period. This creates the risk of blackouts (poor reliability) and expensive electricity (affordability).

The most practical short-term electrical generation pathway is a hybrid system combining renewable generation with gas backup to maintain reliability while reducing emissions. Over the longer term, a combination of renewables, large-scale storage or preferably the latest generation nuclear power, may provide the most balanced solution for achieving Victoria's net zero emissions goals while maintaining an abundance of affordable and reliable electricity supply for a growing population and a growing economy (including the recent influx of power demanding proposed data centres and the predicted growth of electric vehicles).

Unfortunately, the electricity infrastructure rating of D in 2026 reflects the shift from a rational engineering-based agnostic optimisation of generation mix type that balances the three competing attributes of reliability, affordability whilst minimizing emissions to an ideologically driven generation regime that focuses on renewables and zero emissions over electricity reliability and affordability, which will have dramatic consequences as the ageing coal fired power stations are retired in the coming years (Yallourn 1450MW scheduled in 2028, followed by Loy Yang A 2000MW around 2035 and Loy Yang B 1000MW in 2047).

Gas (D): Gas infrastructure investment in Victoria between 2010 and 2026 shifted from a multi-billion-dollar legacy field expansion to a tight focus on grid reliability and decommissioning of gas generation assets. This dramatic shift was the direct result of an anti-gas policy legislated by the Government from 2014 with a push toward electrification, even though electricity ironically relies predominantly on brown coal generation with associated emissions three times that of gas per unit of electricity generated.

This anti-gas policy resulted in no exploration of onshore gas from 2012 to 2020, until the ban was lifted for conventional onshore gas from 2021, due to the predicted future shortfalls of gas from the declining Bass Strait reserves (the 2017 ban on onshore fracking remains). The Government then pivoted and started planning for the import of gas from other regions of Australia when realizing a potential future shortfall in gas supply. Fortunately, from 2024 common sense prevailed and the Victoria Government opened new exploration licenses for conventional gas onshore from the Gippsland Basin (near Woodside) and offshore from the Otway Basin.

The Victorian Government is now in conflict between electrification for all new homes and the need for gas for electricity generation as the coal-fired power stations are retired. Consequently, due to the lack of investment over the past decade the rating for gas infrastructure has fallen from C in 2010 to D in 2026, with further demise expected over the coming decade unless the policy settings begin to favour gas production.

Telecommunication B

The telecommunication infrastructure has improved to a rating of B 'Good' in 2026 from a rating of

C in 2010. The improved rating to 'Good' is reflective of the installation of the National Broadband Network, a $70B investment since 2010, for 'fibre-to-the- node' and in some cases 'fibre-to-the-premise'. Further, 'Space X' (Elon Musk) and its communication subsidiary 'Starlink' has recently provided excellent coverage from satellites to around 200,000 connections across Australia, particularly for regional and outback customers where existing infrastructure is often not adequate.

03
Comment on Infrastructure Victoria

Infrastructure Victoria (IV) was established in 2015 but has now been mooted by the State Government to be closed in 2027. During this period IV produced many detailed reports including several infrastructure planning reports with 30-year horizons, that whilst very useful documents did not appear to have much impact on Government short term decisions, that often appeared political driven (eg. Suburban Rail Loop, Westgate Tunnel project).

- The continuation of Infrastructure Victoria with a different governance framework and refined terms of reference is still considered essential and importantly provides a direct interface with Infrastructure Australia to ensure that Victorian 'business-case-projects' are clearly identified, prioritised and ready for access to Australian Government funding.
- Infrastructure Victoria, in partnership with the relevant Government Departments, should lead the development of long-term, integrated infrastructure plans that consider the complexities and priorities of infrastructure development across our State and ensure successful implementation through increased investment in the project planning and consultation phases.
- Importantly, a pipeline of projects needs to be prioritised with timing that balances both project funding and construction resourcing availability to ensure best value.
- This requires a skilled Government workforce with both technical and commercial depth that intimately understands the different infrastructure systems and understands the investment needed to create better performing assets that are fit for purpose.
- Only an 'informed buyer' representing the Government who deeply understands the different infrastructure systems can partner with private enterprise and successfully maintain existing and deliver new infrastructure that is considered best value for the investment undertaken.

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